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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN PANOS, : 
Plaintiff and Appellant, : 
: District Court No. 910901425PI 
vs. : 940904176PI 
SMITHS FOOD & DRUG : 
CENTERS, INC., : Court of Appeals No. 950286-CA 
Defendant and Appellee. : Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Issue on Appeal 
Whether the trial court correctly concluded that the March 11, 1992 
Order of Dismissal was a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure instead of a dismissal without 
prejudice pursuant to Rule 4-103(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b); Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration 4-103(2). 
II. Standard of Review for Involuntary Dismissal 
Under Rule 4Kb) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
The appellate court must give great weight to the findings made and 
the inferences drawn by the trial judge dismissing a case under Rule 41(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A lower court's dismissal of a case 
under Rule 41(b) will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear from the 
record that it has abused its discretion. On the other hand, the 
appellate court does not defer to conclusions of law but reviews them for 
correctness. Wilson v. Lambert. 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980); Maxfield v. 
Rushton. 779 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Southern Title Guar. Co.. 
Inc. v. Bethers. 761 P.2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-103 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Rule 41(b) is attached in 
Addendum as Exhibit "A"; Rule 4-103 is attached in Addendum as 
Exhibit "B". 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case arose as the result of an alleged slip and fall of the 
Plaintiff and Appellant, John Panos ("Panos"), in a grocery store operated 
by Defendant and Appellee, Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. 
("Smith's"), on June 30, 1990. (Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2; R. 40-41). The subject grocery 
store is located at 800 South and 900 East, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. (Id.). 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court 
On or about February 21, 1991, Panos filed his initial Complaint in 
the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 910901425 PI. (Complaint at 
3; R. 4). On November 13, 1991, Judge Richard H. Moffat issued an 
Order requesting that the parties appear before the Court and show cause 
why Panos's Complaint should not be dismissed. (Order to Show Cause, 
attached in Addendum as Exhibit "C"; R. 8). Panos appeared at the Order 
to Show Cause hearing on December 11, 1991, and presumably argued 
that there was good cause not to dismiss the case. (Minute Entry dated 
3 
December 11, 1991, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "D"; R. 10). On 
December 11, 1991, Judge Moffat ordered that Panos either settle the case 
or file a Certificate of Readiness for Trial on or before March 11, 1992, 
or the action would be dismissed. (Id.). Panos did not comply with the 
Order and Panos v. Smiths Food King. Civil No. 910901425 PI, was 
dismissed. (Court's Order of Dismissal, attached in Addendum as Exhibit 
"E"; R. 11). 
After learning that the case was dismissed, Panos refiled his 
Complaint on June 30, 1994, in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil 
No. 940904176 PI. (Complaint and Jury Demand; R. 279-283). Smith's 
moved to dismiss Panos's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure asserting that the dismissal of Panos v. Smith's 
Food King. Civil No. 910901425 PI, was a dismissal with prejudice 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss; R. 286-287). Panos responded by arguing that the 
previous dismissal was without prejudice and did not dispose of the claim 
against Smith's. (Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss; R. 288-306). 
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At a hearing on January 23, 1995, Judge Anne M. Stirba listened to 
arguments on Smith's Motion to Dismiss. (Oral Argument and Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "F"; R. 
381-399). Judge Stirba concluded that the March 11, 1992, dismissal was 
a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (Id. at 16-18, Exhibit "F"; R. 396-98; Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "G"; R. 
354-55.). This appeal followed. (Notice of Appeal; R. 357-358). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case arose as the result of an alleged slip and fall of 
Panos on a lettuce leaf in Smith's grocery store located in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. (Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 1-2; R. 40-41). The incident occurred on June 
30, 1990. (Id.). 
2. On or about February 21, 1991, attorney Anthony M. 
Thurber filed a Complaint on behalf of Panos for injuries arising out of the 
slip and fall occurrence of June 30, 1990. (Complaint; R. 2-5). The case 
5 
was assigned to the Honorable Richard H. Moffat of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Civil No. 910901425. (Id.). 
3. After approximately nine months of inactivity on the 
case, Judge Moffat sent an order on November 13, 1991, requesting the 
parties to appear before the court on December 11, 1991, to show cause 
why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Order to 
Show Cause, Exhibit "C"; R. 8). 
4. Mr. Thurber appeared at the Order to Show Cause 
Hearing on December 11, 1991, and presumably argued that there was 
good cause not to dismiss the case. (Minute Entry dated December 11, 
1991, Exhibit "D"; R. 10). The Court ordered as follows in its Minute 
Entry of December 11: "Counsel have until March 11, 1992 to settle this 
case or file a Certificate of Readiness for Trial. If neither are done, the 
case will be dismissed without further notice to counsel." (Id.). 
5. Panos failed to comply with the Court's Order of March 
11,1992. (Court'sOrderof Dismissal, Exhibit "E"; R. 11). The Court 
therefore ordered that Panos's case was dismissed because there was no 
6 
compliance with the Order of December 11, 1991. (Id.)- The Court's 
Order of Dismissal read as follows: 
This case came before the court on December 11, 1991 
for a hearing on the Court's Order to Show Cause for 
dismissal. At that hearing, counsel were advised that this case 
had to be settled by March 11, 1992 or a Certificate of 
Readiness for Trial filed. If neither of these were done, then 
the court on it's own motion would dismiss this case without 
further notice to counsel. 
The court finds that a Certificate of Readiness has not yet 
been filed and the file does not reflect that this case has been 
settled. 
Therefore, the Court on it's own motion orders that this 
case is hereby DISMISSED. 
(Id.)-
6. The Court's Order of Dismissal did not provide whether 
it was with or without prejudice. (Id.). 
7. On or about October 30, 1992, Mr. Thurber withdrew as 
counsel for Panos. (Withdrawal of Counsel; R. 12). 
8. On or about January 14, 1993, Gordon K. Jensen entered 
his appearance as counsel for Panos. (Entry of Appearance of Counsel; 
R. 15). 
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9. On or about June 20, 1994, Mr. Jensen filed on behalf of 
Panos a Motion to Vacate the Court's Order of Dismissal entered on 
March 11, 1992, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Dismissal; R. 198-199). On or 
about June 23, 1994, Smith's filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Panos' 
Motion to Vacate Dismissal. (Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Dismissal; R. 220-239). After hearing 
argument from counsel for both parties, Judge Ronald O. Hyde, in an 
Order dated July 7, 1994, denied Panos' Motion for an Order Vacating the 
Order of Dismissal. (Order; R. 265-266). 
10. Panos filed a second Complaint on June 30, 1994, for 
injuries arising from the slip and fall incident of June 30, 1990. 
(Complaint and Jury Demand 1ffl 2, 9-12; R. 279-283). This second 
Complaint alleged the same facts and causes of action as Panos alleged in 
his original Complaint of February 21, 1991. (Id.). The case was 
assigned to the Honorable Anne M. Stirba of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Civil No. 940904176. (Id.)-
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11. On or about August 10, 1994, Smith's filed with the 
court a Motion to Dismiss Panos' Complaint on grounds that Panos' 
claims had been previously ordered dismissed with prejudice under Rule 
41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by Judge Richard H. Moffat in 
his Order dated March 11, 1992. (Smith's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss; R. 288-306). Panos filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Smith's Motion to Dismiss arguing that Judge Moffat's 
Order of Dismissal was made pursuant to Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration and therefore was without prejudice. (Panos' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; R. 308-
333). 
12. A hearing on Smith's Motion to Dismiss was held before 
Judge Stirba on January 23, 1995. (Minute Entry dated November 1, 
1994; R. 349). After hearing argument from counsel for both parties, 
Judge Stirba granted Smith's Motion to Dismiss. (Order granting 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit "G"; R. 354-355; Oral Argument 
and Ruling, Exhibit "F"; R. 381-398). Judge Stirba stated in her order as 
follows: 
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The Court finds that the Order of Dismissal entered by 
Judge Richard H. Moffat on March 11, 1992, in John Panos v. 
Smith's Food King. Civil No. 910901425, was made pursuant 
to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
operated as an adjudication upon the merits of the case . . . . 
(Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit "G", R. 354-55). 
13. Panos filed a Notice of Appeal on or about March 3, 
1995. (Notice of Appeal; R. 357-358). Panos appeals from the Order 
entered on February 3, 1995, by Judge Stirba granting Smith's Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (Id.). Panos also appealed from the order 
entered on July 7, 1994, by Judge Ronald O. Hyde denying Panos's 
Motion for an Order Vacating Judge Moffat's Order of Dismissal. (Id.) 
In a Memorandum Decision filed on May 25, 1995, this Court dismissed 
Panos's appeal from Judge Hyde's order on the basis that the appeal was 
not timely filed within 30 days and therefore the Court lacked jurisdiction 
over the appeal. (Memorandum Decision filed May 25, 1995). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court correctly concluded that the March 11, 1992 
dismissal was a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Panos did not comply with a Court order 
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and only under Rule 41(b) and not Rule 4-103 can a case be dismissed for 
noncompliance with a court order. Furthermore, the dismissal is held to 
be with prejudice according to Rule 41(b) since the Court did not specifiy 
if it was with or without prejudice. 
II. A Rule 41(b) dismissal is a decision within the broad discretion 
of the trial court. The background of this case demonstrates that it is one 
which warrants a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Not only did Panos fail to take any action in 
the case for almost two years, he failed to comply with a Court order. 
The Utah appellate courts have consistently affirmed Rule 41(b) dismissals 
in cases similar to the instant case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
JUDGE STIRBA CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE MARCH 11, 1992 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS A 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO RULE 
41(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
In bringing this appeal from Judge Stirba's Order granting Smith's 
Motion to Dismiss, Panos erroneously contends that this action was 
dismissed without prejudice by Judge Moffat under Rule 4-103(2) of the 
11 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Rule 4-103(2) provides in pertinent 
part: 
(2) If a certificate of readiness for trial has not been served 
and filed within 180 days of the filing date, the clerk shall mail 
written notification to the parties stating that absent a showing 
of good cause by a date specified in the notification, the court 
shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-103(2), Exhibit "B". The 
record of this case makes clear, however, that Panos's action could only 
have been dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with a court 
order under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit "G"; R. 354-355. 
The background of this case shows that on or about February 21, 
1991, attorney Anthony M. Thurber filed a Complaint on behalf of Panos. 
Complaint; R. 2-5. After approximately nine months of inactivity on the 
case, Judge Richard H. Moffat ordered the parties to appear and show 
cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
Order to Show Cause, Exhibit "C"; R. 8. The Court did not dismiss the 
case because Mr. Thurber appeared at the hearing and presumably argued 
that there was good cause for the Court not to dismiss the case. Oral 
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Argument and Ruling at 17, Exhibit "F"; R. 397. Based on the discussion 
at the order to show cause hearing, the Court ordered that: "Counsel have 
until March 11, 1992 to settle this case or file a Certificate of Readiness 
for trial. If neither are done, the case will be dismissed without farther 
notice to counsel." Minute Entry dated December 11, 1991, Exhibit "D"; 
R. 10. 
Panos failed to comply with the Court's order and Judge Moffat 
dismissed the case on March 11, 1992. Court's Order of Dismissal, 
Exhibit "E"; R. 11. In his Order of Dismissal, Judge Moffat stated as 
follows: 
This case came before the court on December 11, 1991 
for a hearing on the Court's Order to Show Cause for 
dismissal. At that hearing, counsel were advised that this case 
had to be settled by March 11, 1992 or a Certificate of 
Readiness for Trial filed. If neither of these were done, then 
the court on it's own motion would dismiss this case without 
further notice to counsel. 
The court finds that a Certificate of Readiness has not yet 
been filed and the file does not reflect that this case has been 
settled. 
Therefore, the Court on it's own motion orders that this 
case is hereby dismissed. 
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The Court could only have taken this action under Rule 41(b) which 
provides in pertinent part: "For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for 
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him." l Utah R. Civ. P. 
41(b), Exhibit "A". 
Based on Rule 41(b), Judge Moffat dismissed this case because, not 
only did Panos fail to prosecute the case, but he failed to comply with an 
order of the Court. Court's Order of Dismissal, Exhibit "E"; R. 11. Rule 
4-103 does not consider or allow a dismissal for failure to comply with an 
order of the Court. Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-103(2), 
Exhibit "B". An action can only be dismissed under Rule 4-103(2) where 
the party fails to show "good cause by a date specified in the notification." 
Id. Panos complied with Rule 4-103 by appearing at the hearing and 
showing good cause why the case should not be dismissed. Only after 
Panos failed to comply with the Court's order of December 11, 1991, did 
the Court dismiss the case. Court's Order of Dismissal, Exhibit "E"; R. 
1
 Judicial authority in Utah has held that a dismissal under Rule 41(b) 
does not need to be made by the defendant; rather, the court on its own 
motion can take action under the rule. Charlie Brown Constr. v. Leisure 
Sports. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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11. Judge Stirba reasoned as follows in deciding that Judge Moffat's 
Order of Dismissal was a 41(b) dismissal with prejudice: 
It appears to me that the second order of Judge Moffat, 
the order requiring the parties to settle or file a certification of 
readiness was not an order that . . . arose out of the 4-103 
process . . . . I think the better-reasoned view is consistent 
with the defendant's view that it then fell under Rule 41, 
involuntary dismissal. Because that order then did not indicate 
whether it was with or without prejudice consistent with the 
language of that Rule, it had to be construed with prejudice. 
Oral Argument and Ruling at 17-18, Exhibit "F"; R. 397-398. 
Panos and his current counsel assert that they should not be punished 
because of previous counsel's failure to prosecute the case and for 
previous counsel's conduct in failing to notify Panos that the lawsuit was 
dismissed. Brief of Appellant at 7. These assertions are irrelevant to the 
issues of this appeal. The failure of a previous attorney to fully adjudicate 
a lawsuit and communicate with his client is not a reason to overturn a 
Rule 41(b) dismissal. In fact, Judge Stirba in her ruling that the March 
11, 1992 dismissal was with prejudice noted: 
15 
The fact that Mr. Panos chose Mr Thurber as his 
attorney and Mr. Thurber dropped the ball and Mr. Thurber 
otherwise did not zealously represent his client in this case is 
not critical in the analysis. It's unfortunate. 
Oral Argument & Ruling at 18, Exhibit "F"; R. 389. 
The Utah Supreme Court case of Pitman v. Bonham. 677 P.2d 1126 
(Utah 1984), illustrates the principle. In Pitman, the plaintiff filed his 
complaint against defendant in April of 1980. In June of that same year, 
defendant took plaintiffs deposition. In March of 1981, plaintiffs 
attorney withdrew from the case. In February of 1982, the court sent 
notice advising the parties of a pre-trial conference date and a trial date in 
March of 1982. When plaintiff did not appear for the trial, defendant 
moved to dismiss the case under Rule 41(b) and the trial court granted the 
motion with prejudice. After the case had been dismissed, plaintiff 
contacted new counsel who brought a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the 
involuntary dismissal. The court denied the Rule 60 motion and plaintiff 
appealed. 
On appeal, the plaintiff in Pitman argued that he was not at fault in 
allowing the case to be dismissed because he had no contact with his 
former counsel following his deposition and his counsel failed to notify 
16 
him of the proceedings in the case. Id- at 1127. The appellate court 
rejected this as a reasonable excuse for failing to prosecute: "[T]he trial 
court was not persuaded that plaintiff presented a reasonable excuse for 
failing to prosecute the case during the two year period he knew the action 
was pending. . . . " Id- at 1127. The Pitman court further reasoned that 
"[a]fter plaintiff filed the complaint, he took no further action, including 
keeping in reasonable contact with his own attorney." Id.2 
Mr. Thurber was the attorney of record for Panos when the original 
complaint was filed, when the dismissal was ordered, and for 
approximately seven months following the dismissal. Withdrawal of 
Counsel; R.12. Panos did nothing during this time period to prosecute his 
claim, and, apparently, he did not keep in reasonable contact with his 
attorney. The appointment of new counsel does not allow Panos to 
escape the conduct of his previous attorney, nor is the lack of contact with 
2
 This Court has said that a party's "failure to communicate with its 
counsel does not satisfy the 'excusable neglect' standard required to set 
aside a judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)." Meadow 
Fresh Farms. Inc. v. Utah State Univ. Dep't. of Agric. 813 P.2d 1216, 
1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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his previous counsel an excuse for failing to prosecute his case or to have 
the dismissal overturned. 
Panos further argues that the dismissal by Judge Moffat should not 
have been allowed since Smith's had yet to file an answer to the 
complaint. Brief of Appellant at 10 and 11. Panos cannot argue that 
Smith's is equally responsible with Panos for not moving the case forward. 
In responding to this same argument, this Court previously held that 
"[although inaction on the part of a defendant may contribute to the 
justifiability of a plaintiff's excuse for delay, the duty to prosecute is a 
duty of due diligence imposed on a plaintiff, not on a defendant." Country 
Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Dep't of Health. 851 P.2d 1212, 
1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).3 
Secondly, Judge Moffat dismissed Panos's case for Panos's failure to 
comply with a court order. Court's Order of Dismissal, Exhibit "E"; R. 
11. The Court did not dismiss the case for Smith's conduct in failing to 
comply with a court order. Consequently, the fact that Smith's had not 
3
 "'The burden is upon the plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course 
without unusual or unreasonable delay.'" Charlie Brown Constr.. 740 P.2d 
at 1370, quoting Lake Meredith Research Co. v. Amity Mtn. Irrigation 
Co.. 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985)). 
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yet answered Panos's Complaint had nothing to do with Judge Moffat's 
dismissal. 
Panos also argues that affirming the Rule 41(b) dismissal with 
prejudice would deprive him of his right to be heard and would be unjust. 
Brief of Appellant at 9. In response to this argument, the Utah Court of 
Appeals wrote: 
Although dismissal with prejudice is a harsh penalty, 
there are numerous cases in which the Utah appellate courts 
have held that party's dilatory conduct justified such action. In 
Maxfield v. Fishier. 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal with 
prejudice based on the plaintiffs "inexcusable neglect in failing 
to prepare and prosecute her claim with reasonable diligence." 
Id- at 1324-25. Similarly, in Charlie Brown Constr. v. Leisure 
Sports. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 765 
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987), we held that, while a trial court must 
afford a plaintiff "an opportunity to be heard and to do 
justice," id- at 1371 (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. 
v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
1975)), it was not error for the trial court to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' case with prejudice due to their abuse of that 
opportunity through dilatory conduct. 
Hill v. Dickerson. 839 P.2d 309, 312 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
In this case, Panos had ample opportunity to prosecute his case but 
failed to do so. In fact, the Court granted an extension of time to Panos to 
allow him to either settle the case or file a Certificate of Readiness for 
19 
Trial. Minute Entry dated December 11, 1991, Exhibit "D"; R. 10. 
Without any justifiable excuse, Panos' previous attorney did not comply 
with the court's order and the case was dismissed. Utah law requires 
plaintiffs "to prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the 
penalty of dismissal." Charlie Brown Constr.. 740 P.2d at 1370. 
Panos believes that this dismissal will not allow him his day in court. 
However, Judge Stirba expressed an opinion to the contrary: 
I think the better-reasoned view is consistent with the 
defendant's view that it fell under Rule 41, involuntary 
dismissal. Because that order then did not indicate whether it 
was with or without prejudice consistent with the language of 
that Rule, it had to be construed with prejudice. The party 
[Panos] was given his day in court in the sense that he was 
given a substantial period of time to prosecute the case. 
Oral Argument & Ruling at 17-18, Exhibit "F"; R. 397-98. 
Panos further contends that since the order of dismissal was on a 
form document sent out by the Court which did not specifically state that it 
was a dismissal with prejudice, the Court should rule that it was without 
prejudice. Brief of Appellant at 8-9. This claim in unfounded. First of 
all, There is no basis for Panos's contention that Judge Moffat's order of 
dismissal was on a form document. To the contrary, a review of the order 
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of dismissal shows that it reflects the facts of the case at hand and the 
matters that were discussed at the hearing on December 11, 1991. Court's 
Order of Dismissal, Exhibit "E"; R. 11. 
Secondly, Rule 41(b) provides that an order of dismissal is with 
prejudice unless the order specifically states that it is without prejudice. 
Rule 41(b) in part reads as follows: 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a 
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided 
for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), Exhibit "A". Since the Court did not specify if it 
was with or without prejudice, the dismissal is held to be with prejudice 
according to Rule 41(b). Judge Stirba adds: 
Judge Moffat did dismiss the case without making a reference 
of whether it was a dismissal with or without prejudice. It's 
really not an uncommon item of occurrence, at least in the 
state trial court. 
. . . I think the better-reasoned view is consistent with 
the defendant's view that it fell under Rule 41, involuntary 
dismissal. Because that order then did not indicate whether it 
was with or without prejudice consistent with the language of 
that Rule, it had to be construed with prejudice. 
Oral Argument & Ruling at 17-18, Exhibit "F"; R. 397-98. 
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The facts of this case show that Judge Moffat properly exercised his 
discretion in ordering the dismissal of Panos's action due to lack of 
diligence in prosecuting the claim and because Panos failed to comply with 
a court order. Judge Stirba correctly concluded that the March 11, 1992, 
order of dismissal was a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a ruling that should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
II. 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PANOS'S ACTION 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Panos seems to argue in his brief that a case must be pending for 
several years before a dismissal under Rule 41(b) is warranted. Brief of 
Appellant at 9-13. Panos states that this case does not fit the 
circumstances of those cases where orders of dismissal were affirmed 
because in those appellate court cases the parties had been engaged in 
ongoing litigation for years. Id. at 9. 
The Utah appellate courts have held that a 41(b) dismissal is a 
decision within the broad discretion of the trial court. Wilson v. Lambert. 
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613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980); Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); Southern Title Guar. Co.. Inc. v. Bethers. 761 P.2d 951 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). "[A] lower court's dismissal of a case under Rule 
41(b) will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear from the record that 
it has abused its discretion." Rushton. 779 P.2d at 239. 
Contrary to what Panos would have the Court believe, the length of 
time that elapses from the filing of the complaint is not a deciding factor in 
considering a Rule 41(b) dismissal. In Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 
237, this Court stated that "there is more to consider in determining if a 
dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper than merely the amount of time 
elapsed since the suit was filed." Id. at 239. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that "[r]ule 41(b) sets no deadline for the moving party to act; 
indeed, the court retains inherent power to dismiss an action for failure to 
prosecute pursuant to its own motion." Wilson. 613 P.2d at 768. 
The case of Hill v. Dickerson. 839 P.2d 309, is instructive. The 
Plaintiff in Hill filed her dental malpractice complaint in March of 1990. 
After twelve months of no activity on the case, the court ordered the 
plaintiff to designate witnesses by April 19, 1991, which the plaintiff did 
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not do. On August 19, 1991, plaintiff finally produced a witness list and 
the defendant responded by filing a Motion in Limine to exclude plaintiffs 
witnesses. The court granted Defendant's Motion in Limine. At the same 
time the Motion in Limine was granted, the court dismissed plaintiffs 
action with prejudice, presumably because plaintiff failed to follow the 
court's order in naming witnesses and completing discovery. The Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal stating that plaintiff had ample 
opportunity to litigate her case but abused such opportunity. Id. at 312; 
See also Pitman. 677 P.2d 1126. 
The case of Charlie Brown Construction Company v. Leisure Sports. 
Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, is also helpful. In Charlie Brown, the court on its 
own initiative filed an order to show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed after eight months of inactivity on the case. After setting the 
case for a pre-trial hearing on several occasions, the court set a final pre-
trial hearing on June 12, 1994. Three days before the hearing, the 
plaintiff's attorney explained to the judge that a settlement of the case was 
likely and therefore he did not attend the June 12 hearing. As a result, the 
judge dismissed the case after no appearances were made at the pre-trial 
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hearing. In affirming the trial court decision, the appellate court 
considered the plaintiffs' failure to comply with court orders and its delays 
in moving the case forward. The appellate court held that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs' action with prejudice 
under Rule 41(b). 
Panos believes that Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul 
W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975), is the case that is 
the most similar to the present case. A review of this opinion shows, 
however, that the two cases are very different. In Westinghouse. the 
defendant asked the plaintiff to produce an extensive number of documents 
for discovery. Because the plaintiff is a nationwide company, the request 
took nine months in which the plaintiff diligently searched for the requests 
in its archives and depositories throughout the country. When the 
documents were collected, the plaintiff then invited the defendant to look 
at the documents at plaintiff's place of business because of the voluminous 
number of documents. The defendants never responded to plaintiffs 
invitation to review the documents and moved to dismiss the case which 
the trial court granted. The Utah Supreme Court overruled stating that the 
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plaintiff was actively pursuing the adjudication of the suit and therefore the 
case should have not been dismissed. Id- at 879. 
Westinghouse is not similar to the instant case. Unlike the plaintiff 
in Westinghouse. Panos was not diligently pursuing the adjudication of the 
claim. In fact, after filing the Complaint, Panos did nothing in the next 
two years to move the case forward. Furthermore, the plaintiff in 
Westinghouse did not ignore a court order which would warrant a 
dismissal of the case as Panos did in the instant action. 
The background of the present case demonstrates that it is one which 
warrants dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b). Judge Moffat did not 
abuse his discretion in ordering a dismissal with prejudice of Panos's 
action. In addition, Judge Stirba also did not err in granting Smith's 
Motion to Dismiss. The order of the trial court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant and Appellee, Smith's Food and 
Drug Centers, Inc., respectfully requests that the Order of the trial court 
granting Smith's Motion for Dismissal be affirmed, the appeal of Panos be 
dismissed, and Smith's awarded its costs on appeal. 
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